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In 2000 the International Law Commission (hereinafter: ILC or Commission) defined in its 
long term programme the topic of “the effect of armed conflict on treaties”2 The reason for it 
was that “the literature on the subject is less than satisfactory. The subject is surely ideal for 
codification and/or progressive development. … The law remains to a considerable degree 
unsettled. … The practice of States as to the effects of armed conflicts on treaties varies.”3 
 
These uncertainties in the legal sources and in the practice of States are compounded by the 
appearance of new phenomena including different forms of military occupation of territory 
and new types of international conflict. It is generally recognized that there is a continuing 
need for the clarification of the law in this area.
4
 
 
It was high time for the Commission to start elaborating this topic, as the ILC already in 1966, 
while drafting the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, have recognized that questions 
may arise as to the legal consequences of an outbreak of hostilities with respect to obligations 
arising from treaties. However, it concluded that “in the international law of today the 
outbreak of hostilities between States must be considered as an entirely abnormal condition, 
and that the rules governing its legal consequences should not be regarded as forming part of 
the general rules of international law applicable in the normal relations between States.”5 
 
Accordingly, the effect of armed conflicts on treaties remained wholly outside the scope of 
the Vienna Convention, thus rendering customary international law the sole applicable law. 
Prior to the prohibition of use of force customary law was well-founded and easy to reveal, 
but since 1945 it is an arduous task to explore state practice and to ascertain opinio juris. 
 
In 2004 the ILC decided to include in its current programme of work this topic. The 
Commission appointed Mr. Ian Brownlie Special Rapporteur.
6
 He submitted his “First report 
on the effects of armed conflict on treaties” at the fifty-seventh session (2005)7 which was 
followed by two other reports in 2006 and 2007.
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The Secretariat concluded an examination of the doctrine and state practice related to this 
subject in a Memorandum
9
. It explains all the theoretical approaches to the topic, the possible 
categorizations of the effects, examines the state practice during and since World War II, and 
the relationship of the topic to other legal doctrines. 
 
In his first report, the Special Rapporteur drew up draft articles along which it is easier to deal 
with this subject. These draft articles and the Memorandum of the Secretariat forms basis of 
the discussions at the ILC and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. 
 
The present state of these draft articles shows that the scope of the articles shall be only in 
respect of treaties between States. Mr. Brownlie highlighted that “there is a vast variety of 
international organisations and their functions. It can be questioned whether the specificity of 
such organisations and their treaty arrangements could be dealt with in this study. Moreover, 
the issues concerning international organisations and armed conflict may be very different to 
those arising from States and armed conflict.”10 
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The Members of the ILC have agreed to use the “treaty” term of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties
11
, but significant disagreement occurred in relation to the definition of 
“armed conflict”. For the purpose of the present draft they are using the following term: 
“Armed conflict” means a state of war or a conflict which involve armed operations which by 
their nature or extent are likely to affect the operation of treaties between States parties to the 
armed conflict or between State parties to the armed conflict and third States, regardless of a 
formal declaration of war or other declaration by any or all of the parties to the armed 
conflict.”12 
 
This “idem per idem” definition arises some questions: If a conflict does not affect 
international treaties it is not a conflict? State of war is a clear legal term, but what is the 
definition of conflict? Are all conflicts armed conflicts, but not all armed conflicts are 
conflicts? Does the “other declaration” refer to a declaration being similar to the declaration 
of war, or shall the declaration be about the effect of the conflict? How can we express the 
effect of a phenomenon, when we cannot even determine the phenomenon itself? 
 
The division of opinion whether non-international armed conflicts shall be included or not 
cannot be ignored: half of the participants opposes it and the other half supports it.
13
 The 
frame of the topic has to be specified exactly, and obviously only those questions shall be 
examined which are in close connection with the core. However, leaving non-international 
armed conflicts out of the work might render the results less valuable, as nowadays the 
number of these conflicts prevails. 
 
After the scope and terms the draft states in Article 3 that “the outbreak of an armed conflict 
does not necessarily terminate or suspend the operation of treaties as (a) between the parties to 
the armed conflict; (b) between one or more parties to the armed conflict and a third State.”14 
This is the most important provision incorporated here, meaning on the one hand that war is 
not an automatic, ipso facto case of termination of international treaties and on the other hand 
that war might not even be a case of termination. The theory behind this innovation is the 
state practice of the past 60 years and the idea of enhancing stability, continuity and legal 
security. 
 
The main guiding principle which determines the susceptibility to termination or suspension 
is the intention of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. (Article 4)
15
 The 
opposition to the reliance upon intention is normally based upon the problems of ascertaining 
the intention of the parties. Article 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention makes clear, the 
meaning of a treaty may be proved by a variety of means. The different methods of 
interpretation, the object and purpose of the treaties, the commentaries or the travaux 
preparatoires help to discover the intention of the parties. Nonetheless it is still a challenge to 
define what happens when the parties had no thought at all about an armed conflict at the time 
of the conclusion. 
 
The draft declares that the mode of suspension or termination shall be the one codified in the 
Vienna Convention.
16
 It has been suggested at the ILC that the legal consequences of 
suspension or termination should be defined, but to do that would be to elaborate the 
provisions of the Vienna Convention, which is not an appropriate task. 
 
According to the Rapporteur it is essential to state that “Treaties applicable to situations of 
armed conflict in accordance with their express provisions are operative in case of an armed 
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conflict, without prejudice to the conclusion of lawful agreements between the parties to the 
armed conflict involving suspension or waiver of the relevant treaties.”17 
 
When declaring that “the outbreak of an armed conflict does not affect the capacity of the 
parties to the armed conflict to conclude treaties in accordance with the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties” it is intended to reflect the experience of belligerents concluding 
agreements between themselves during the conflict.
18
 
 
“The application of standard-setting treaties, including treaties concerning human rights and 
environmental protection, continues in time of armed conflict, but their application is 
determined by reference to the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed 
conflict.”19 This draft provision originates in the idea of including a provision based upon the 
principle stated by the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons advisory 
opinion
20
 relating to the relation between human rights and the applicable lex specialis, the 
law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.
21
 The 
role of the provision in the draft is to provide a useful clarification. 
 
The ILC felt necessary to collect those types of treaties which - owing to their object and 
purpose - continue in operation during an armed conflict. The draft articles include the 
following treaties as such: 
 
(a) Treaties expressly applicable in case of an armed conflict; 
(b) Treaties declaring, creating or regulating permanent rights, a permanent regime or status; 
(c) Treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation and analogous agreements concerning 
private rights; 
(d) Treaties for the protection of human rights; 
(e) Treaties relating to the protection of the environment; 
(f) Treaties relating to international watercourses and related installations and facilities; 
(g) Multilateral law-making treaties; 
(h) Treaties relating to the settlement of disputes between States by peaceful means; 
(i) Obligations arising under multilateral conventions relating to commercial arbitration and 
the enforcement of awards; 
(j) Treaties relating to diplomatic relations and consular relations.
22
 
 
The whole provision seems to be redundant, in view of the role already played by draft 
articles 3 and 4, but the Special Rapporteur emphasised that the list shall be included either as 
one of the articles or as an annex, though it was indicative and expository.
23
 In support of the 
inclusion of such a list it can also be mentioned that without it the regulation would be too 
abstract. 
 
The Special Rapporteur does not regard the inclusion of treaties or treaty provisions codifying 
jus cogens rules into this list as acceptable. Such possibility raises a major question of general 
international law, and one which is notoriously difficult. Moreover, this category is not 
qualitatively similar to the other categories which have been proposed.
24
 Though the exact list 
and place of jus cogens among the legal sources of international law is not clear, it is hardly 
understandable how can armed conflicts affect peremptory norms when these norms shall be 
respected universally in all situations.  
 
The draft makes it possible to resume the suspended treaties in accordance with the provisions 
of the Vienna Convention
25
 and are without prejudice to the competence of parties to an 
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armed conflict to regulate the question of the maintenance in force or revival of treaties, 
suspended or terminated as a result of the armed conflict, on the basis of agreement.
26
 
 
Concerns were expressed, both in the ILC and in the Sixth Committee, to the effect that the 
draft shall not leave open the possibility that there would be no difference in the legal effect 
concerning treaty relations between an aggressor State and a State acting in self-defence. An 
aggressor State should not benefit from its aggression, and “to allow a unilateral assertion of 
an illegal use of force as a basis for the termination or suspension of treaties is likely to be 
inimical to the stability of treaty relations.”27 Another side of the question is that how can an 
illegal act (meaning use of force) result in the termination or suspension of a legal act 
(meaning a valid and legally binding treaty). 
 
The articles shall be without prejudice to the legal effects of decisions of the Security Council 
in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and 
also to the status of third States as neutrals in relation to an armed conflict.
28
 
 
The likelihood of a substantial flow of information from States is small and the identification 
of relevant State practice is, in this sphere, unusually difficult, because the modern State 
practice commonly refers to the effect of a fundamental change of circumstances or to the 
supervening impossibility of performance. Also according to some publicists it might be 
difficult to draw a line between the rebus sic stantibus principle and the effect of war, as 
major hostilities could be regarded as changed circumstances.
29
 Furthermore, all three of 
them, the effect of war, impossibility and rebus sic stantibus can be mixed when stating that 
“it is not so much the fact that a war has broken out, but rather the impossibility to implement 
the treaty, owing to the change in the conditions which presided over its conclusion, which 
affects the treaty.”30 (The ILC has not dealt with the question of distinction in the Reports, 
and it is a complex topic, thus not a subject of the present study.) 
 
It took several decades for the ILC to venture to explore this question and it is most probable 
that almost the same duration of time will pass before the ILC reaches a common view. In the 
last 3 years, since it is on the agenda, the ILC was able to define the rough frame of the topic, 
the draft articles form an adequate basis for the elucidation of the problems, but yet no 
answers are given. 
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